Circumspect Foreign Policy: Washington and Eisenhower’s Farewell Addresses

While Washington famously urges America in his 1796 Farewell Address to focus on preserving union at home for the “permanency of [its] felicity as a people,” Eisenhower in his 1961 Farewell Address identifies extensive foreign involvement as a necessity to preserve peace and “enhance liberty, dignity, and integrity among people and among nations.” These two presidents seem to offer very different visions of American foreign policy’s basic purposes. Can the principles of the two speeches admit reconciliation?

Read More

Circumspect Foreign Policy: Washington and Eisenhower’s Farewell Addresses

While Washington famously urges America in his 1796 Farewell Address to focus on preserving union at home for the “permanency of [its] felicity as a people,” Eisenhower in his 1961 Farewell Address identifies extensive foreign involvement as a necessity to preserve peace and “enhance liberty, dignity, and integrity among people and among nations.” These two presidents seem to offer very different visions of American foreign policy’s basic purposes. Can the principles of the two speeches admit reconciliation?

Read More

Clausewitz, On Art and the Theory of Art

Art in its widest sense is any human activity for which the ability is not directly given to him by Nature, nor is it developed through her hand. Man has received from Nature the developed abilities of the senses (at least it seems so); he has learned (through instinct) to walk, eat, drink, etc., by her hand. Both kinds of abilities cannot count as art.

Read More

Clausewitz, On Art and the Theory of Art

Art in its widest sense is any human activity for which the ability is not directly given to him by Nature, nor is it developed through her hand. Man has received from Nature the developed abilities of the senses (at least it seems so); he has learned (through instinct) to walk, eat, drink, etc., by her hand. Both kinds of abilities cannot count as art.

Read More

Clausewitz’s “Artikel” on Art: An Introduction

“On Art and the Theory of Art” is a rigorous investigation exploring the differences between art and science; the possibility of art theory; the necessity of practice and talent; the possibility of any laws or rules of art; and the difficulty of exceptions to these rules or laws, among other topics. It is a deep meditation on the relationship between purposes (Zweck) and means (Mittel), which is also the title of On War Book One, chapter two. Art requires judgment, one of the most important mental capabilities of the commander, while science—in the broad 19th century philosophical sense—requires cognition.

Read More

Clausewitz’s “Artikel” on Art: An Introduction

“On Art and the Theory of Art” is a rigorous investigation exploring the differences between art and science; the possibility of art theory; the necessity of practice and talent; the possibility of any laws or rules of art; and the difficulty of exceptions to these rules or laws, among other topics. It is a deep meditation on the relationship between purposes (Zweck) and means (Mittel), which is also the title of On War Book One, chapter two. Art requires judgment, one of the most important mental capabilities of the commander, while science—in the broad 19th century philosophical sense—requires cognition.

Read More

Fusing Politics and Scientific Innovation: Vannevar Bush’s “Modern Arms and Free Men”

In the aftermath of the Second World War, engineer and chief science advisor to Franklin Delano Roosevelt Vannevar Bush wrote "Modern Arms and Free Men: A Discussion of the Role of Science in Preserving Democracy." World War II had been marked by incredible technological innovations that changed the course of the war, culminating in the atom bomb. The lessons of that war, Bush hoped, would help chart a course for the United States through its new confrontation with its ally-turned-adversary, the Soviet Union.

Read More

Fusing Politics and Scientific Innovation: Vannevar Bush’s “Modern Arms and Free Men”

In the aftermath of the Second World War, engineer and chief science advisor to Franklin Delano Roosevelt Vannevar Bush wrote "Modern Arms and Free Men: A Discussion of the Role of Science in Preserving Democracy." World War II had been marked by incredible technological innovations that changed the course of the war, culminating in the atom bomb. The lessons of that war, Bush hoped, would help chart a course for the United States through its new confrontation with its ally-turned-adversary, the Soviet Union.

Read More

Diplomacy as the Art of Continuous Negotiations: Cardinal de Richelieu and the “Political Testament”

The hard-won trajectory of his career enabled Richelieu to develop the temperament and experience to step into the role of Prime Minister for a struggling France in 1624. At the time, the kingdom was not ready to challenge the dominance of the Habsburgs, whose extensive borders almost surrounded France. Years of war, religious turmoil, and bitter domestic conflict had weakened France’s finances, military, and foreign policy institutions. Therefore, the first decade or so of Richelieu’s appointment was occupied with strengthening the state administration, tempering heated domestic divisions, and solidifying the monarchy’s power by crushing threats to it. His tactics against the Habsburgs in particular tended to be oriented to the long-term, employing exhaustion, harassment, and the solidifying of other alliances—at times in opposition to Catholic hardliners who disliked forming alliances with Protestant powers. Despite being a cardinal of the church, Richelieu was responsible more than any other individual for turning this conflict from a primarily religious one into a primarily political one. He was able to do so through his focus on strengthening France’s international relations once the domestic relations were put in order. Richelieu’s influence on France came at a critical moment in the evolution of diplomatic practices, from ad hoc missions to resident embassies, which ushered in what has been called “the golden age of diplomacy.” He particularly aided in solidifying the practice of continuous negotiations, being one of the first prominent political figures “to insist on [its] importance to a community of states,” and its compatibility with the doctrine of raison d'état in modern European history.

Read More

Diplomacy as the Art of Continuous Negotiations: Cardinal de Richelieu and the “Political Testament”

The hard-won trajectory of his career enabled Richelieu to develop the temperament and experience to step into the role of Prime Minister for a struggling France in 1624. At the time, the kingdom was not ready to challenge the dominance of the Habsburgs, whose extensive borders almost surrounded France. Years of war, religious turmoil, and bitter domestic conflict had weakened France’s finances, military, and foreign policy institutions. Therefore, the first decade or so of Richelieu’s appointment was occupied with strengthening the state administration, tempering heated domestic divisions, and solidifying the monarchy’s power by crushing threats to it. His tactics against the Habsburgs in particular tended to be oriented to the long-term, employing exhaustion, harassment, and the solidifying of other alliances—at times in opposition to Catholic hardliners who disliked forming alliances with Protestant powers. Despite being a cardinal of the church, Richelieu was responsible more than any other individual for turning this conflict from a primarily religious one into a primarily political one. He was able to do so through his focus on strengthening France’s international relations once the domestic relations were put in order. Richelieu’s influence on France came at a critical moment in the evolution of diplomatic practices, from ad hoc missions to resident embassies, which ushered in what has been called “the golden age of diplomacy.” He particularly aided in solidifying the practice of continuous negotiations, being one of the first prominent political figures “to insist on [its] importance to a community of states,” and its compatibility with the doctrine of raison d'état in modern European history.

Read More

“Unvarying Courtesy” or “Unbending Determination”? The 1907 Eyre Crowe Memorandum and the Dilemmas of Strategic Forecasting

Kaiser Wilhelm II points out an event of interest to the British Junior Minister at the Colonial Office, Winston Churchill, during the summer manoeuvres of the Imperial German Army in 1906.

Two general schools of thought regarding Crowe and his famous Memorandum have emerged. Some scholars paint Crowe as a latter-day Cassandra who foresaw the structural trends that were hurling the two powers toward confrontation and articulated the necessary course of action, which his government failed to undertake until it was too late. Harvard’s Graham Allison compares the Crowe Memorandum to the writings of Thucydides, whose History of the Peloponnesian War identified the dilemma that a dominant power faces when it must either accede to the rise of a challenger or risk eventual war with it. The other school of thought argues that Crowe delivered only self-fulfilling prophecies by helping to institutionalize an attitude of anti-German animus. One prominent German historian even dubbed Crowe the “evil spirit of the Foreign Office.” With these two schools of thought forming in play, the bulk of the literature on Crowe has accordingly sought to determine the precise extent and manner of his influence on British-German relations both before and after the First World War.

Read More
Kaiser Wilhelm II points out an event of interest to the British Junior Minister at the Colonial Office, Winston Churchill, during the summer manoeuvres of the Imperial German Army in 1906.

“Unvarying Courtesy” or “Unbending Determination”? The 1907 Eyre Crowe Memorandum and the Dilemmas of Strategic Forecasting

Two general schools of thought regarding Crowe and his famous Memorandum have emerged. Some scholars paint Crowe as a latter-day Cassandra who foresaw the structural trends that were hurling the two powers toward confrontation and articulated the necessary course of action, which his government failed to undertake until it was too late. Harvard’s Graham Allison compares the Crowe Memorandum to the writings of Thucydides, whose History of the Peloponnesian War identified the dilemma that a dominant power faces when it must either accede to the rise of a challenger or risk eventual war with it. The other school of thought argues that Crowe delivered only self-fulfilling prophecies by helping to institutionalize an attitude of anti-German animus. One prominent German historian even dubbed Crowe the “evil spirit of the Foreign Office.” With these two schools of thought forming in play, the bulk of the literature on Crowe has accordingly sought to determine the precise extent and manner of his influence on British-German relations both before and after the First World War.

Read More

Alfred Thayer Mahan: “The Influence of Sea Power Upon History” as Strategy, Grand Strategy, and Polemic

As a history of naval war Influence makes for dull reading. Rather, Mahan is interested in the more fundamental relationship between national primacy and the sea. Without commerce, territorial infrastructure, and political will, naval preponderance is unsustainable. Momentary superiority in tonnage or deployable warships often masks a deeper brittleness. As Mahan puts it when discussing the War of the Spanish Succession: “The sea power of England therefore was not merely in the great navy, with which we too commonly and exclusively associate it; France had had such a navy in 1688, and it shriveled away like a leaf in the fire.” In this respect, Mahan actually shares a great deal with later critics who highlight the importance of a dynamic economy as the ultimate source of national or imperial power. Today, U.S. strategists concerned with the vulnerability of sea lines of communication, a retreat from global commitments, or the hollowing out of the domestic industrial base, could find common cause with Mahan’s logic. Without those elements of Sea Power, pure military or naval strength is a colossus with feet of clay. 

Read More

Alfred Thayer Mahan: “The Influence of Sea Power Upon History” as Strategy, Grand Strategy, and Polemic

As a history of naval war Influence makes for dull reading. Rather, Mahan is interested in the more fundamental relationship between national primacy and the sea. Without commerce, territorial infrastructure, and political will, naval preponderance is unsustainable. Momentary superiority in tonnage or deployable warships often masks a deeper brittleness. As Mahan puts it when discussing the War of the Spanish Succession: “The sea power of England therefore was not merely in the great navy, with which we too commonly and exclusively associate it; France had had such a navy in 1688, and it shriveled away like a leaf in the fire.” In this respect, Mahan actually shares a great deal with later critics who highlight the importance of a dynamic economy as the ultimate source of national or imperial power. Today, U.S. strategists concerned with the vulnerability of sea lines of communication, a retreat from global commitments, or the hollowing out of the domestic industrial base, could find common cause with Mahan’s logic. Without those elements of Sea Power, pure military or naval strength is a colossus with feet of clay. 

Read More

Churchill and the World Crisis

Churchill believes that, in trying retrospectively to untangle the complex knot of causation, it is critical to appreciate one primary, dynamic element – the deeply engrained Franco-German antagonism, a polarity that forced other nations, out of fear, opportunism, or both, to choose sides.  Britain was the last and most reluctant great European power to do so, and even at the last moment it was not clear, to outsiders at least, whether her choice would hold. 

Read More

Churchill and the World Crisis

Churchill believes that, in trying retrospectively to untangle the complex knot of causation, it is critical to appreciate one primary, dynamic element – the deeply engrained Franco-German antagonism, a polarity that forced other nations, out of fear, opportunism, or both, to choose sides.  Britain was the last and most reluctant great European power to do so, and even at the last moment it was not clear, to outsiders at least, whether her choice would hold. 

Read More

Colin Gray’s Geopolitics — Then and Now

Colin Gray's influential 1977 monograph, "The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era, Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution," helped to revive an understanding of international politics that had been largely discredited by its association with the Nazis and the German geopolitik of Karl Haushofer. Gray maintained this foundational assessment of international politics throughout his career, which took him through the end of the Cold War, the so-called post-Cold War, and what is now called the era of great power competition.

Read More

Colin Gray’s Geopolitics — Then and Now

Colin Gray's influential 1977 monograph, "The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era, Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution," helped to revive an understanding of international politics that had been largely discredited by its association with the Nazis and the German geopolitik of Karl Haushofer. Gray maintained this foundational assessment of international politics throughout his career, which took him through the end of the Cold War, the so-called post-Cold War, and what is now called the era of great power competition.

Read More

Kissinger and China

Ten years after publication of Kissinger's On China, the reader is invited to assess Kissinger’s judgment in light of such events as the unwinding of the global financial crisis and increased Chinese assertiveness, the shift in American foreign policy towards a great power competition framework, and Covid-19. His book appeared shortly before Graham Allison’s influential and controversial work on the Thucydides trap. I extrapolated from his argument at the time — perhaps inaccurately, but worthy of consideration — that Kissinger concluded the rise of China towards its historic position as the Middle Kingdom, if accommodated properly to a globalized world, is more or less inevitable and, rightly understood, desirable.

Read More

Kissinger and China

Ten years after publication of Kissinger's On China, the reader is invited to assess Kissinger’s judgment in light of such events as the unwinding of the global financial crisis and increased Chinese assertiveness, the shift in American foreign policy towards a great power competition framework, and Covid-19. His book appeared shortly before Graham Allison’s influential and controversial work on the Thucydides trap. I extrapolated from his argument at the time — perhaps inaccurately, but worthy of consideration — that Kissinger concluded the rise of China towards its historic position as the Middle Kingdom, if accommodated properly to a globalized world, is more or less inevitable and, rightly understood, desirable.

Read More