Armand Jean du Plessis (1585-1642), known as Cardinal de Richelieu, is credited with being “the most important single figure” in consolidating French power and aiding its transformation into a centralized state.[1] While his most influential role was as an adviser to King Louis XIII, he gathered experience from decades of serving his country. From humble beginnings in a poor but titled family, he worked his way through roles such as Foreign Secretary, Minister of State, Governor of Brittany, Grand Master of Navigation, Secretary of State, and Secretary of War. His service had ups and downs, at the lowest point suffering exile by the Queen-Mother Marie de Medici, and at the height, achieving the role of Prime Minister under Louis XIII.[2]
The hard-won trajectory of his career enabled Richelieu to develop the temperament and experience to step into the role of Prime Minister for a struggling France in 1624. At the time, the kingdom was not ready to challenge the dominance of the Habsburgs, whose extensive borders almost surrounded France. Years of war, religious turmoil, and bitter domestic conflict had weakened France’s finances, military, and foreign policy institutions. Therefore, the first decade or so of Richelieu’s appointment was occupied with strengthening the state administration, tempering heated domestic divisions, and solidifying the monarchy’s power by crushing threats to it. His tactics against the Habsburgs in particular tended to be oriented to the long-term, employing exhaustion, harassment, and the solidifying of other alliances—at times in opposition to Catholic hardliners who disliked forming alliances with Protestant powers.[3] Despite being a cardinal of the church, Richelieu was responsible more than any other individual for turning this conflict from a primarily religious one into a primarily political one. He was able to do so through his focus on strengthening France’s international relations once the domestic relations were put in order.[4]
Richelieu’s writings in his Political Testament provide insight into the thoughts of this influential figure during a pivotal time in French and diplomatic history. His political career and legacy are well-documented in history books, in the analysis of political thinkers, and in Richelieu’s own political publications. But it is in the words of his Political Testament, which he did not intend for publication, that one gains a unique and largely unfiltered glimpse into this pivotal political actor’s guiding principles.[5]
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Any study of Cardinal Richelieu would be remiss without first mentioning that Richelieu was a pragmatic individual, whose preference was to treat problems situationally, but within the context of long-term goals. He did not believe that abstract, systematic theories on states or diplomacy would dictate a perfect response to each situation, but rather, that a political figure must be flexible, approaching each scenario with knowledge of the variables while utilizing a variety of political tools. Even in this contextual approach to politics, Richelieu’s advice about which tools and personal virtues are useful can be seen as overarching principles that apply to many political contexts.
When Richelieu first put pen to paper for his Political Testament, he intended both to document and to glorify the reign of Louis XIII; however, he quickly realized that his poor health would prevent his ability to do so fully. Accordingly, he limited the audience of the Political Testament to King Louis XIII and to Richelieu’s own successor as prime minister, conceiving it to be more of “a book of observations and maxims for the king’s guidance should fate still [Richelieu’s] hand.”[6] It runs upwards to 360 pages in the best French editions, and it is divided into two parts with eighteen total chapters. Part I is an establishing section, a look back at the history of France, its society, and government institutions. Part II is more prospective, oriented towards policy and comprised of pithy advice.
In a book intended for publication, an author may prudently withhold some truths to avoid domestic or international consequences. Thus, when Richelieu shifted the project to be a private work, it arguably became an accurate distillation of his political thought, since the only filter applied is one that is designed to persuade the king. Even an ambivalent reader will quickly note that Richelieu speaks rather bluntly to his ruler and is unafraid of stating truths in a manner that may be deemed harsh at times. There is a unified intention behind this range of tones, which is to provide the best advice for the protection and proper governance of France. The motivation behind his tone is explicitly revealed by Richelieu himself in the final chapter of Part I; he instructs royal councilors in Chapter VIII, “The Qualifications for Royal Councillors [sic]” on how to talk with kings. He advises that an official should always cautiously discuss kingly faults in private. If one tries to reveal publicly the king’s faults (for what one presumes would be personal gain), it is criminal. But to help the king see his faults privately is “to bring about [their] genuine correction.”[7]
Richelieu’s writings and political actions specifically affected King Louis XIII of France in the late 16th and early 17th century. Even while Richelieu intended this work to be private, its content is applicable beyond the reign of Louis XIII or even other kings of France.[8] Richelieu claims and shows throughout the work that many of the principles he shares are useful for the governance of a state, whether explicitly for a king or implicitly for an adviser who would help the king achieve the interests of the state. Success in such an endeavor is particularly guaranteed, according to Richelieu, should readers of his work be devoted to God and to themselves (in other words, by keeping their words and promises).
While ours is no longer the era of kings, Richelieu’s Political Testament remains uniquely situated to provide insight for the modern reader. Its private design allows a blunter appraisal of diplomacy (both its practice then and its principles in general) than public works that are constrained by the need for secrecy or by fear of reprisal. Additionally, we have the benefit of hindsight to know that Richelieu’s practices were instrumental in ushering in France’s transformation from a feudal state into the modern conception of the state familiar to us today, with power consolidated in the state rather than handfuls of individuals. It was Richelieu’s actions toward this end that also helped facilitate significant changes in the practice of diplomacy.
Previously, diplomatic missions tended to be created on an ad hoc basis, instituted for a single purpose and disbanded when completed. The subsequent implementation of a continuous negotiation model—by way of establishing the resident diplomat—was a relatively new practice in Richelieu’s day, the origin of which is often attributed to 15th century Italian city-states. Richelieu was convinced of the necessity of maintaining this practice due to the broad range of benefits it afforded. Therefore, the job of a diplomat was a never-ending one, which filled in the gaps left by laws and treaties, and required art as much as science to execute well; theory as much as specific practice.
An examination of Richelieu’s diplomatic ideals in the Political Testament will showcase the attributes that made him such a successful political actor. His understanding of how the king and the good of the kingdom are intertwined inform his recommendations for the job requirements of diplomats. Furthermore, his advice to kings and diplomats to shift to the practice of continuous negotiations transformed France in his time and inspired the continuation of the practice through the reign of King Louis XIV and beyond. Finally, to illustrate further Richelieu’s legacy to France and to the practice and institutions of diplomacy after his death, this essay will end with a brief comparison of Richelieu’s thoughts and the writings of François Callières, a political writer and actor who served under King Louis XIV.
Kings and the Public Good
In order for France to meet its defensive priorities abroad and counter Hapsburg continental domination, Richelieu understands that France has to get her internal house in order. To get her internal house in order, it’s the king who first must understand his obligations vis a vis personal comfort and the public good. Kings can be prone to act selfishly, and historically have often done so, as if their private gain and the public good were one and the same. Richelieu, however, asserts that the king must accept instead that he serves the public good, even at the occasional expense of his private comfort. Ever practical, Richelieu’s reasoning is rooted in the reality of a monarchical government. In a monarchy, the ruler is leader, legislator, and judge. He or she is the primary power—so how does one get a ruler to act well? One of the ways that Richelieu attempts to square this circle is by defining the king’s private interests in the context of the public good.
As a cardinal of the Catholic church, Richelieu’s reasoning also has some theological roots. Richelieu claims that God gave everyone common sense. Therefore, man is acting both according to his own nature and to God’s will if he acts with reason. If a king is reasonable, he will thereby win the favor of God and his populace.[9] In addition, it is reasonable to assume that if God placed a king in such a role to protect his kingdom, then it is the king’s duty to ensure that all his acts of commission and omission serve that end, lest he be judged by God on Judgment Day.[10] By introducing the concept of divine judgment, Richelieu therefore also introduces the concept that a king’s behavior can be differentiated between private gain and public benefit. While he does not give license to courtiers and citizens to pass this judgment on the king’s behavior, he does open the door for the possibility of judgement on the king, through God’s judgment, the king’s self-reflection, and the gentle advice of advisers like Richelieu himself.
The public good should be first and foremost in the mind of the king and all his public officials, and preferred to all private gain. Richelieu cites Spain as an example of this concept in practice, pointing out how changes in the court’s ministers do not disrupt the country’s policies, unlike the then contemporary French practice.[11] Internal conflict, particularly among nobles fueled by a desire for private gain, is distracting France from international relations. He urges the king to get his governmental “house” in order, both literally and figuratively, so as to consolidate the power France needs to achieve national security and prosperity.[12] He is so concerned with the internal conflict he has observed in France since his appointment to public office that he begins Political Testament with an evaluation of the current flaws and required remedies for the different societal orders: the ecclesiastical, the nobles, and the commoners. While his advice varies depending on the order, the unified goal of the reforms is to increase the political health of the kingdom by bringing the various orders into alignment with national interests, and in order to re-engage their neighboring kingdoms[13] and Rome.[14]
While Richelieu discusses the need to praise and punish public officials to keep them in line with the public interest, he concludes his work with the admonition that a king has an even higher standard of duty and obligation to his country than other public officials. The standard is so high that even a slight deviation from his kingly duty is considered a sin of omission, which can have more impact than the sins of commission by private individuals.[15]There is no pause or break from this standard. Indeed, for a king, Richelieu states:
[…] if on all occasions they do not give preference to the public interest over all private ones, though they otherwise be good, they find themselves much more culpable than those who transgress the laws and commandments of God either by commission or omission, it being certain, of course, that acts of commission and omission are really equally culpable.[16]
The king must also have power to advance the public interest. Power is one of the “most necessary” requirements for a king’s grandeur and a country’s success. Both nationals and foreigners are far more likely to respect one who can hurt them, and when coupled with esteem, a king can achieve much glory and security with power. Power takes many forms, like branches on a tree, including a good reputation, sufficient military, money, and the hearts of his subjects.[17] The power of a good reputation with neighboring states is particularly important, and it is achieved through diplomatic means. It is on this subject that we see Richelieu’s conception of how the kingdom’s good relies on international connections.
Common sense, which Richelieu is at pains to remind the reader is a divine gift to all men, dictates that “it is necessary to watch our neighbors closely, because their proximity gives them the chance to be bothersome.”[18] Likewise, geographical neighbors can be an additional buffer on one’s own borders against enemies. The king and his counselors, if intelligent, will fortify against any eventuality by staying in touch with their nearby kingdoms in order to learn their secrets. With these tenets in mind, only “mediocre mind(s)” would restrict their vision and policy to their native state.[19] Unfortunately, mediocre minds are exactly what Richelieu feels he is contending with as principal minister, as evidenced by his assessment of the nobility.
For the good of France, Richelieu contends it is not just good but necessary to act everywhere, in all states, and particularly in Rome. The papal court at this time was the “diplomatic and geographical center of the world,” and “there actually is no place where power is more highly rated than at his court.”[20] In other words, the respect a country gains through a good reputation in Rome is a strong form of power the king can use to advance national security and economic prosperity across the world. Again, the first step to get a good reputation in Rome is to establish a strong internal order. He likens the relation between good internal order and a good reputation to the relation between healthy organs and a good color in the face.[21] Here we see that even Richelieu’s domestic advice was intended as a stepping stone to consolidate France’s power into the hands of the king, and for the king to use that power for the economic prosperity, national security, and international reputation of France.
The Public Good Requires Competent Diplomats
Ambassadors, or diplomats, are extensions of the king’s will. They represent him in foreign courts and in Rome, and therefore they must meet a certain standard to be appointed. But additionally, they also must maintain a standard of behavior to be effective in their role. Richelieu states that the goal of the Political Testament is of such importance that he must emphasize the following:
. . . it is absolutely necessary to be discerning in the choice of ambassadors and other negotiators, and one cannot be too severe in punishing those who exceed their authority, since by such misdeeds they compromise the reputation of princes as well as the fortune of states.[22]
Since reputation is one of the important manifestations of state power, ambassadors who exceed their authority can have a severe negative impact on the public good. In most cases, an individual’s characteristics have a direct impact on his behavior, and thus choosing an ambassador well is key to the security and prosperity of the nation. In Richelieu’s era, diplomats were seen as representatives of the kings, in the sense that they re-presented the person of the king in foreign courts. They were held to a high standard of behavior. In exchange, they were afforded a high level of protection in the diplomatic immunity practices of the time. While the modern era focuses more on the functional necessity of diplomats, the connection between the behavior of a diplomat and the perception of their home country are inextricably intertwined in all ages.
Richelieu advises appointing individuals who are balanced, neither ignorant of the history and politics of the great states of Europe nor narrow specialists who lecture more than engage in multilateral conversations: “Just as ignoramuses are not good negotiators, so there are certain minds so finely drawn and delicately organized as to be even less well suited, since they become overly subtle about everything.”[23] Rather, ambassadors should hold themselves to a middle course, being smart but grounded.
The two exceptions where Richelieu expects extremes are in experience and devotion to the state. Since the role ambassadors play in executing a king’s will and watching out for state interests is so important, he advises appointing only people with deep experience, not apprentices. To put such a role in the hands of an apprentice would be like having a doctor practice new cures on those of power and importance.[24] Richelieu spends little time defending this claim, perhaps believing reason makes it self-evident. Instead, he devotes the bulk of his time to emphasizing why those who favor private gain over the public good are so dangerous.
Ambassadors should be devoted to the state above all personal desires, which Richelieu specifically emphasizes at the end of his chapter on choosing and punishing ambassadors, and which he then re-emphasizes in the next chapter on appointing suitable men to public office. He states that he has “had so many experiences with this truth that. . . I must say that anyone who lacks the necessary devotion to the welfare of the state will fail to be rigorous in [state] matters.”[25] If officials are too little devoted to the public good, dangers can develop along a spectrum of behavior. On one end, they are corrupt, indolent, and irresponsible; on the other, they are too personally ambitious. The resulting behavior in both cases is a lack of rigor in state negotiations. Without rigor, they are more likely to enter bad deals for the nation and jeopardize its power.
In Part II, Chapter VIII, “The Need to Appoint Suitable Men to Public Offices,” Richelieu spends surprisingly little time focusing on what specific personal characteristics qualify an individual as suitable for public office or diplomatic service, rather concentrating on the dangers of favoritism and again emphasizing the necessity of appointing those who are devoted to the state. He advises the king to replace the practice of appointing favorites to public office with the appointment of those who have earned it by merit. While there can be favorites who are also suited for the role of ambassador, a king must exercise caution to ensure that the truly best and most fitted for the role are appointed to it. A king must rule by reason, he reiterates, as is designed by God and favored by man. Favorites, however, “are especially dangerous because those elevated by fortune seldom are influenced by reason, which is not useful to their ends.”[26] Therefore, it is also more likely that the favored are more motivated by their private interests than by their devotion to the state, which can lead them to misuse their responsibilities. In addition, if a king is blinded by favoritism, he may overlook a candidate who is much better suited to the office than any favorites. Not only is this a loss for the state, but it also can breed resentment among the king’s subjects who do not feel that hard work and merit will be rewarded.[27] Finally, favorites are more likely to have gained their king’s esteem through flattery. Richelieu groups flatterers with slanderers and call them a “plague,” a term he uses sparingly in his work. To weed out flatterers, a king would need to evaluate the merit of his court and the outcomes of their behavior. Richelieu does this by defining flatterers as people who create confusion, upend law and order, and who do not have the merit sufficient to secure the role in any other way.[28] He sees them as so bad that he advises banishment as the only reasonable solution—the alternative being to risk undermining the public good.[29]
In summation, the fate of even the greatest states depends on solid negotiation by talented ministers motivated by the public good. Therefore, a prudent prince would only carefully appoint diplomats who are naturally disposed and properly educated to fulfill this demanding role. It involves good communication, a keen mind able to forge treaties, the dexterity to take advantage of his circumstances, and above all else, a devotion to the good of France.
The Public Good Requires Continuous Negotiation
Richelieu devotes the entirety of Chapter VI in Part II to the need for continuous negotiation in diplomacy. He goes so far as to say that the benefit from this practice is “unbelievable unless it is known from experience.”[30] He himself took five or six years in Louis XIII’s employ to realize this truth, but he became “so convinced of its validity” that he now asserts, “it is absolutely necessary to the well-being of the state to negotiate ceaselessly, either openly or secretly, in all places . . .”[31] The only qualification he places on the benefits is the need to have negotiations conducted “with prudence,” seeing benefits from negotiations regardless of location, time, or initial perceived utility.[32]
Continuous foreign negotiations are a practice with low risk and potentially high reward. In terms of their risk, Richelieu describes negotiations as “innocuous remedies which never do harm.”[33] This practice also gains a lot of information for diplomats, which is then passed on to the king. All this information grants foresight, or the ability to anticipate future events and therefore shape a more favorable environment for one’s own state. Richelieu emphatically believed that successful government required foresight, stating that “Nothing is more necessary in governing a state than foresight, since by its use one can easily prevent many evils which can be corrected only with great difficulty to transpire.”[34] By way of analogy, preventing a disease has a lower cost and lower risk than curing a disease already acquired. When foresight is combined with vigorous action, it enables a king to act at the moment of greatest advantage for the state.
To gain foresight effectively takes great occupation and uninterrupted attention, which is why relaxation is almost impossible for the best public officials. However, as a reward, the citizens can sleep without fear and profit from this devotion, as public officials can nip problems in the bud with less risk and energy than if they had to tackle the problem in full bloom.[35] This lowers risk and allows one to choose the moment that would yield the greatest benefit in which to act:
He who negotiates continuously will find the right instant to attain his ends, and even if this does not come about, at least it can be said he has lost nothing while keeping abreast of events in the world, which is not of little consequence in the lives of states.[36]
To advance, Richelieu recommends tailoring negotiations to both the form of government on the other side of the table and to the capacity of the individuals negotiating. In terms of nations, he notes that nations differ in character, “some quickly carry out what they have in mind, while others have feet of lead.” Republics are an example of slow movers, so he recommends a tiered approach to negotiations when it comes to dealing with republics. With republics, one should not expect to achieve full results the first time around, rather accepting a little in the present in hopes of receiving more later. By wisely choosing a slower negotiation rate with a republic, the diplomatic corps leaders will allow the time to process and achieve the best results for one’s own country by pressing them “only when they are ready for it.”[37]
In addition, wise negotiators will also tailor their tactics to the capacity of the individual with whom they are engaging in conversation. For example, a negotiator should present strong convincing reasons to men of power and genius. But when dealing with mediocre minds, small points tend to be more influential, as they “are on their level of comprehension” and less likely to overwhelm them than a true assessment of major problems.[38] Regardless of the adjustment of tactics per state or individual, important negotiations should never be interrupted, not even for a moment. This requires pursuing goals with vigor, never ceasing to act “intelligently and resourcefully, becoming neither indifferent, vacillating, nor irresolute.”[39]
When one takes a step back and reviews Richelieu’s advice to and about ministers as a whole, one sees that he firmly believes the prosperity of a nation is predicated on ministers who have good character, have sound judgment, possess knowledge of human history and politics, and are keen readers of human nature. He clearly has a high standard for the role of diplomats, which is directly connected to his conviction that continuous negotiations are absolutely required for the good of the state.
Richelieu bolsters his case for continuous negotiations with a series of practical advice to negotiators to be applied based on circumstances. Speaking and acting boldly when one is on the moral or godly side of an issue is more likely to smother a rupture than to cause one. Sometimes it is best to ignore imprudent remarks from the other party, instead focusing on the relevant parts to further one’s goal for the conversation. Blustering is a presumptuous and ineffective tool that looks silly and does not work against honorable men, and so it is best avoided. His practical advice must be applied to the right circumstances, however, which is why the ability to act with prudence is required in all ambassadors. Prudence is required to judge the proper tactic for a situation, and dexterity and vigor are required to apply it properly. Therefore, not everyone is equally cut out to serve this role well, which one can easily discern through common sense.[40]
The vigorous and consistent effort it takes to pursue negotiations frequently pays off, but not always. Things can go wrong, even with the wisest direction, and so an ambassador must guard against discouragement in these cases, as “[i]t is difficult to fight often and always win.”[41] In other words, statistically speaking, by increasing the amount of negotiations to a continuous level, diplomats also increase the chances of problematic issues arising due to behavior or just ill fortune. If the unhappy results are on a small matter, then a negotiator should be grateful that the impact was smaller than it could have been, and not let this loss hinder him from strongly pursuing his other works. At minimum, if all a negotiation does is gain time, then it counts as a win. Gained time “often is the sole outcome” and is always useful to states, “since it frequently takes only an instant to divert a storm.”[42] He advises diplomats to continue their good work, despite the occasional setback, as there is no way to completely eradicate risk in international affairs.
Richelieu states, “I can truthfully say that I have seen in my time the nature of affairs change completely for both France and the rest of Christendom as a result of my having, under the authority of the King, put this principle into practice—something up to then completely neglected in this realm.”[43] Many historians and statesmen, including the later French diplomat and thinker Francois de Callières, agree that Richelieu’s practices had a significant impact on France and the age of diplomacy. Therefore, Richelieu’s attribution of his own success to enacting continuous negotiation should not be lightly brushed aside.
Influence of Cardinal Richelieu on François de Callières
Richelieu’s Political Testament focuses on the relation between the king and the public good, with the latter requiring a strong international presence on the part of the monarch’s ministers; thus diplomats are essentially a derivative, secondary concern. Callières’ own scholarship in The Art of Diplomacy shifts the focus onto the diplomats themselves: how their role fits into the whole of international relations and how they can do their part well. Both Richelieu and Callières hold a mirror to the same country, the one reflecting the king, and the other reflecting his diplomatic servants. Since Richelieu’s view of diplomacy is clearly paralleled in Callières’ view several years later, an examination of Richelieu’s influence on this French diplomat and political author is a useful way to trace the beginning of Richelieu’s legacy.
François de Callières was a diplomat under the reign of Louis XIII’s successor Louis XIV, making Callières a direct beneficiary of Richelieu’s political thoughts and diplomatic system. Callières explicitly holds Richelieu in great esteem, saying he “may be proposed as a model to the greatest statesman and to whom France is so much indebted.”[44] After quoting extensively from Richelieu’s Political Testament, Callières praises it directly:
The testimony of this great genius ought to have the greater weight, in that the great things which he has done by the means of negotiation, are convincing proofs of the truth which he advances. There was nothing of any moment that passed in Europe during his ministry, but that he had a very great share in; and he was the primum mobile of the principal revolutions that happened in it while he lived.[45]
While Callières is guilty of being occasionally too vague or too generous to Richelieu’s role in specific historical events in this text, overall Callières’ esteem of Richelieu’s practices has been time-tested and proven to be well-placed. The transition from ad hoc diplomacy to resident diplomacy created the foundation for politics as it is practiced today.
Like Richelieu, Callières held diplomats to a high standard, given the impact he believed their role to have on national interests and world affairs. He believed that diplomats should be hired from the best of the best, given the needs of the role to excel at negotiation, read human behavior, and understand the intricacies of current politics. The first sentence of The Art of Diplomacy sets the tone of the work by elucidating the scope of responsibilities of diplomats, as Callières understood it:
The art of negotiating with sovereign Princes is of so great importance, that the fate of the greatest States often depends on the good or bad conduct, and on the capacity of the ministers who are employed therein. So that Princes, and their chief ministers, cannot be too careful in examining into the natural and acquired endowments of the persons whom they send into foreign countries, to cultivate a good correspondence between them and their ministers, to make treaties of peace, alliance and commerce, and others of the like nature; to defeat those treaties which other Princes may be negotiating to the prejudice of their Sovereign, and in general to take care of the respective advantages which may be obtained of foreigners, according as occasion shall present.[46]
In summation, the fate of even the greatest states depends on solid negotiation, so a prudent prince or king must carefully appoint diplomats who are naturally disposed and properly educated to fulfill this demanding role. Such a role involves good communication, a keen mind able to forge treaties, the cunning to discover and disrupt schemes contrary to his home state, and the dexterity to take advantage of his circumstances as understood by his industrious collection and keen judgement of the foreign court’s mechanisms.
Both Callières and Richelieu were utterly convinced that the well-being of a state required continuous negotiations with all countries despite their difference in attitude regarding international relations. Richelieu emphasized state interest and competition of states, even in religiously motivated cases; Callières placed more emphasis on the shared interests and interdependence of states as it constituted the “great commonwealth of Europe.” Callières sees the states of Europe as being closely knit not only by commerce and treaty, but also by nature. They are so intertwined that a change to one member of this society will inevitably disrupt the others.[47] In both Richelieu’s more realist and Callières more liberal approach to politics, however, is a shared understanding of the undeniable benefits from the practice of continuous negotiations.
While Richelieu waited to address continuous negotiations until Part II of his work, Callières makes the case for continuous negotiations in the second chapter of The Art of Diplomacy as the fundamental diplomatic practice. It is also in this chapter that he first mentions Richelieu. Callières notes that Richelieu, in practice, kept ministers and agents in constant residency at “all sorts of countries,” to which practice he (and Richelieu himself in the Political Testament) attributes the many great advantages won for the State. He introduces the practice of continuous negotiations at the end of chapter one in the same language as Richelieu. While some allowances must be made for the English translations of the originally French texts, here are the two translations side by side for comparison, with common phrases being bolded:
Richelieu: “... I dare say emphatically that it is absolutely necessary to the well-being of the state to negotiate ceaselessly, either openly or secretly, and in all places, even in those from which no present fruits are reaped and still more in those for which no future prospects as yet seem likely.”[48]
Callières: “… it will be proper to explain how it is useful, nay, even necessary to Sovereigns, and especially to those who govern great States, to keep on foot constant negotiations, both in countries near at hand and remote, either openly or secretly, in times of peace, and also in time of war.”[49]
Callières’ intended audience is would-be ambassadors and the rulers who would hire them, so his chapter delves into practical advice for ambassadors (that is, ministers) in their work and for princes in hiring more so than does Richelieu’s work. Thematic throughout his advice is the echo of Richelieu’s admonitions to accrue foresight. If diplomats are on site when a great enterprise is forming in another country, then they will be able to formulate a preventative plan of action rather than being purely reactive down the line.[50] The alternative, waiting until an event transpires to send an ambassador, only sets the minister up for failure. An envoy dispatched at the moment of crisis would not have the requisite time to make acquaintances or deepen friendships that could help him change resolutions, leaving him to rely on “substantial sums.” However, this money not only costs the ruler monetarily, but it also has less efficacy if used too late.[51]
Like Richelieu, Callières also defines whether a negotiation is ill or well-managed by the prudence of the ambassador. The degree of advantage a country gains from a negotiation, Callières goes on to explicitly state, rises or falls “in proportion to the degree of skill and ability of the persons who are employed as ministers.”[52] Therefore, he ends his chapter on continuous negotiations in the same way as Richelieu; each chapter ends with an exhortation to choose ambassadors well.[53]
The admonitions of these influential men are still applicable in the political world they helped to found. The practice of continuous negotiations is an essential aspect of the contemporary political landscape, made all the more enmeshed by the advent of advanced communication technologies. Let us not forget that in an era of mechanical advancement, the merit of the people across a range of offices can and do impact the fate of nations.
Olivia Beaty is an Insights Storyteller who utilizes the power of qualitative analysis to help humans understand humans. She received her PhD from Baylor University, and she is interested in the intersections of diplomacy, political theory, organizations, and communications. She resides in Houston, TX, with her dog, husband, and extensive collection of books.
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NOTES
[1] I use Henry Bertram Hill’s well-respected translation of the Political Testament. While Hill did choose not to translate and publish some sections, he did this only for lean or repetitious ones and was careful to preserve the overall work and be faithful “always to the spirit and usually to the letter” (xv).
Hill, Betram (ed.). The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu: The Significant Chapters and Supporting Selections. (1961). Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. xv.
[2] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, iv.
[3] Raison d’Etat: Richelieu’s Grand Strategy During the Thirty Years’ War. (2019, June 25). Retrieved June 8, 2020, from https://tnsr.org/2019/06/raison-detat-richelieus-grand-strategy-during-the-thirty-years-war/
[4] Richelieu, Cardinal (1585—1642). (2012). In G. R. Berridge, & L. Lloyd, The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Diplomacy (3rd ed.). Macmillan Publishers Ltd. Credo Reference.
[5] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu.
[6] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, ix.
[7] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 58.
[8] “Those who guide themselves by the rules and precepts contained in this testament will without doubt acquire names of no little weight in the minds of both their subjects and their foreign neighbors.” Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 117.
[9] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 69.
[10] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 124-125.
[11] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 74.
[12] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 9.
[13] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 7-8.
[14] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 93.
[15] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 123.
[16] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 124.
[17] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 117-122.
[18] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 93.
[19] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 94.
[20] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 93.
[21] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 93.
[22] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 100.
[23] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 95.
[24] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 101.
[25] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 100.
[26] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 105.
[27] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 104.
[28] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 109.
[29] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 110.
[30] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 92.
[31] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 92.
[32] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 92.
[33] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 92.
[34] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 78.
[35] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 80.
[36] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 92.
[37] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 94.
[38] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 94-95.
[39] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 96.
[40] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 95.
[41] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 96.
[42] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 97.
[43] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 92.
[44] Callières, François de, The Art of Diplomacy, Keens-Soper, H.M.A. & Schweizer, K.W. editors (1983). New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers. 69.
[45] Callières, François de, The Art of Diplomacy, 70-71.
[46] Callières, François de, The Art of Diplomacy, 65.
[47] Callières, François de, The Art of Diplomacy, 68.
[48] Hill, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, 92.
[49] Callières, François de, The Art of Diplomacy, 67.
[50] Callières, François de, The Art of Diplomacy, 69.
[51] Callières, François de, The Art of Diplomacy, 69.
[52] Callières, François de, The Art of Diplomacy, 73.
[53] Callières, François de, The Art of Diplomacy, 74.
