Structure and Contingency: the Causes of the Peloponnesian War

The Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) was “a war like no other.” It was a 27 year conflict that brought an end to the fifth century Athenian Golden Age, killed more Greeks in one year than the Persians killed in ten, and, in the end, seemed to solve nothing.

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Structure and Contingency: the Causes of the Peloponnesian War

The Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) was “a war like no other.” It was a 27 year conflict that brought an end to the fifth century Athenian Golden Age, killed more Greeks in one year than the Persians killed in ten, and, in the end, seemed to solve nothing.

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Colin S. Gray on Thucydides and the Definition of Future Threats

Thucydides leaves us no doubt that the principal threat to the security of Athenians flowed more from the distinctly flawed working of the empire’s democratic politics, especially its procliv­ity to promote crowd pleasing demagogues who were short of competence, high ethical standards, or both, than from vengeful Persians or strategically pedestrian Spartans. Political ruin tends to begin and end at home. Students of international relations need to remember this plain warning from the historical record.

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Colin S. Gray on Thucydides and the Definition of Future Threats

Thucydides leaves us no doubt that the principal threat to the security of Athenians flowed more from the distinctly flawed working of the empire’s democratic politics, especially its procliv­ity to promote crowd pleasing demagogues who were short of competence, high ethical standards, or both, than from vengeful Persians or strategically pedestrian Spartans. Political ruin tends to begin and end at home. Students of international relations need to remember this plain warning from the historical record.

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Are We all Clausewitians Now? Reflections on the Work of John Keegan

“I have not been in a battle; not near one, nor heard one from afar, nor seen the aftermath.”  Thus John Keegan, later Sir John, began his landmark book, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme, published in 1976.  Despite this bit of caution, Keegan’s book was immediately hailed as a classic; one that conveyed what the experiences of combat was like for the participants, above all the common soldier. 

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Are We all Clausewitians Now? Reflections on the Work of John Keegan

“I have not been in a battle; not near one, nor heard one from afar, nor seen the aftermath.”  Thus John Keegan, later Sir John, began his landmark book, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme, published in 1976.  Despite this bit of caution, Keegan’s book was immediately hailed as a classic; one that conveyed what the experiences of combat was like for the participants, above all the common soldier. 

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On Sophocles’ Antigone and Modern Tyrants

Tyrants are prone to seek domination of ever-larger possessions, and the only constraint on their expansion, aside from internal strife, is effective opposition by external powers. If they are not combated, tyrants can indeed be highly disruptive of international stability.

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On Sophocles’ Antigone and Modern Tyrants

Tyrants are prone to seek domination of ever-larger possessions, and the only constraint on their expansion, aside from internal strife, is effective opposition by external powers. If they are not combated, tyrants can indeed be highly disruptive of international stability.

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Naval Works of Note: Herbert Richmond’s Statesmen and Sea-Power (1946)

British grand strategy has from the very outset been confronted with notably complex issues.  On the one hand, there is the necessity to control of the sea, as the sine qua non of the entire system, in order to ensure against invasion, secure trade, and maintain their colonies against European rivals.

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Naval Works of Note: Herbert Richmond’s Statesmen and Sea-Power (1946)

British grand strategy has from the very outset been confronted with notably complex issues.  On the one hand, there is the necessity to control of the sea, as the sine qua non of the entire system, in order to ensure against invasion, secure trade, and maintain their colonies against European rivals.

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Mary P. Nichols on Thucydides and the Pursuit of Freedom

Cities and individuals in Thucydides' history take freedom as their goal, whether they claim to possess it and want to maintain it or whether they desire to attain it for themselves or others. Freedom is the goal of both antagonists in the Peloponnesian War, Sparta and Athens, although in different ways. One of the fullest expressions of freedom can be seen in the rhetoric of Thucydides’ Pericles, especially in his famous funeral oration.

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Mary P. Nichols on Thucydides and the Pursuit of Freedom

Cities and individuals in Thucydides' history take freedom as their goal, whether they claim to possess it and want to maintain it or whether they desire to attain it for themselves or others. Freedom is the goal of both antagonists in the Peloponnesian War, Sparta and Athens, although in different ways. One of the fullest expressions of freedom can be seen in the rhetoric of Thucydides’ Pericles, especially in his famous funeral oration.

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Not your Father’s Geopolitics

Those of us of a Classical bent are occasionally jarred by references to “geopolitics” that do not seem to square with the understanding we gained from reading authorities such as Mahan, Mackinder, and Spykman.  Although we felt that we were properly critical of particular aspects of these geopolitical teachings, were are reminded that in recent years, something formally called “critical geopolitics” has emerged – a postmodern understanding of space, “identity,” and politics. 

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Not your Father’s Geopolitics

Those of us of a Classical bent are occasionally jarred by references to “geopolitics” that do not seem to square with the understanding we gained from reading authorities such as Mahan, Mackinder, and Spykman.  Although we felt that we were properly critical of particular aspects of these geopolitical teachings, were are reminded that in recent years, something formally called “critical geopolitics” has emerged – a postmodern understanding of space, “identity,” and politics. 

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A Contemporary Hat Tip to Makers of Modern Strategy

In "Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China," Robert Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis argue that because the American effort to “integrate” China into the liberal international order has now generated new threats to U.S. primacy in Asia—and could result in a consequential challenge to American power globally—Washington needs a new grand strategy toward China that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy.

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A Contemporary Hat Tip to Makers of Modern Strategy

In "Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China," Robert Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis argue that because the American effort to “integrate” China into the liberal international order has now generated new threats to U.S. primacy in Asia—and could result in a consequential challenge to American power globally—Washington needs a new grand strategy toward China that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy.

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Churchill: Literature in the Service of Grand Strategy

Churchill develops a continuity of principle from the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights (Glorious Revolution) through the Declaration of Independence and the American Constitution, a continuity that extended to joint cooperation in the fight against Hitler and in the Cold War.  One might object that, as a matter of fact, the Declaration formally divided the two great branches of the English-speaking peoples.  But Churchill was getting at something deeper than mere history.  This was literature in the service of the Grandest Strategy.

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Churchill: Literature in the Service of Grand Strategy

Churchill develops a continuity of principle from the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights (Glorious Revolution) through the Declaration of Independence and the American Constitution, a continuity that extended to joint cooperation in the fight against Hitler and in the Cold War.  One might object that, as a matter of fact, the Declaration formally divided the two great branches of the English-speaking peoples.  But Churchill was getting at something deeper than mere history.  This was literature in the service of the Grandest Strategy.

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