INSTITUTE OF WORLD POLITICS

IWP 628, MILITARY STRATEGY: Theory and Practice
Second Summer Term, 2020; Mondays & Wednesdays, 6:30-9:30 PM

Dr. Christopher C. Harmon*
Bren Chair of Great Power Competition
Marine Corps University & its Foundation
CHarmon@iwp.edu ; *ChrisCHarmon@gmail.com*
IWP general tel. 202-462-2101
Office hours: 2 to 5 p.m. on Mondays, & by appointment

Course Objectives

This course is designed to teach students to think strategically and analytically, sharpening the student's ability to assess a variety of situations and compare alternative courses of action to achieve overall national political purposes. Students will be asked to think in a disciplined, critical, and original manner about the international environment and a range of potential strategies.

Course Content

Strategy has been viewed traditionally as the relationship between war's purpose and the means to achieve this political end. Strategy provides a theory of victory that explains how a state can translate the employment of the specific means of military operations into the achievement of overall national objectives. In addition, the Military Strategy course focuses on long-term competitions in war and peace, and therefore considers non-military elements of state power and the use of "soft power" in international affairs. In the words of British strategist Sir Basil Liddell Hart:

> …fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy – which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and not least of ethical pressure…[F]urther, while the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace.

This course takes a more traditional view of grand strategy than that currently found in academic debates, emphasizing the role and importance of military power for war-fighting, coercion, and deterrence.

Strategy is about interaction, as adversaries seek to frustrate the best-laid plans in war, overturn the peace imposed upon them, or reshape the international environment to their advantage. A good strategic leader must anticipate the dynamics of interaction in a contest against determined foes. A skillful enemy that employs asymmetric strategies or an adversary from an unfamiliar culture may prove especially difficult to defeat. The interaction among adversaries and allies

greatly complicates strategy and constitutes a theme running through the course's diverse case studies.

Our case studies in IWP #628 are distinctive in several respects. First, the course examines the strategic dynamics of full-blooded wars. Such wars often entail protracted periods of intense fighting that produce truces and peace settlements, interwar and prewar eras, as well as cold war conflicts and crises leading to war. This dynamic provides an opportunity to consider the long-term effectiveness of all instruments of national power. Second, the case studies and leading strategic thinkers featured in the readings examine diverse types of wars, encompassing a variety of operations and different keys to success. Success in one kind of war may be followed by failure in another. An important aspect of strategic leadership is the ability to adapt to different types of wars and threats. Third, the course analyzes the strategic success and failure of great and regional powers, and non-state actors over long periods of time. It contrasts maritime powers with land powers, exploring the different strategies open to them, and examines the resiliency of different kinds of political systems. Last, the case studies include status quo and revisionist states, and established and emerging powers.

This course examines wars of various types, sizes, and combinations. Three basic types of war stand out in our syllabus: big (and protracted) wars fought for high stakes by the most powerful states of the international system, utilizing coalitions and engaging in multiple theaters; regional wars fought within a single theater (or two contiguous theaters), typically of shorter duration than big wars; and insurgencies fought within a country, against a failing, emerging, or well established state, by a non-state movement that seeks to secede from or overturn the existing political system. Almost every historical case study of this course incorporates at least two of these basic types of war, and some case studies include all three types.

This course also reveals that new cases of each basic type of war differ in significant respects from previous cases. There is a fundamental nature to war and to its basic types that is virtually unchanging over time, but there are other characteristics that do change radically. Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, former President of the Naval War College in Newport, emphasized the importance of in-depth examinations of historical case studies for a course on strategy in a convocation speech:

> Studying historical examples should enable us to view current issues and trends through a broader perspective of the basic elements of strategy. Approaching today's problems through a study of the past is one way to ensure that we do not become trapped within the limits of our own experience.

The IWP military strategy course adopts an interdisciplinary approach by drawing on the disciplines of history, political science, international relations, and economics. It integrates these academic perspectives with critical military factors from the profession of arms, such as doctrine, weaponry, training, technology, and logistics. The resulting synthesis provides a coherent framework of analysis to assess complex strategic problems and formulate strategies to address them.

Our readings consist of two core components: strategic theory and historical perspectives. The works of major strategic thinkers — such as Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sir Julian Corbett, and Mao Tse-tung, — provide analytical foundation, while case studies furnish the materials to construct an analytical framework to understand the interrelationship of policy and strategy. The case studies allow students to evaluate and discuss the ways in which strategic leaders in the real world have successfully (or unsuccessfully) grappled with the challenges associated with the use of force and other instruments of power to attain national objectives. IWP #628 develops the analytical skills to deal more effectively with current problems in policy and strategy, and those that might emerge in the future.

Learning outcomes

Upon completing this course, students are expected to be:

- Able to think strategically and critically about all types of wars and strategic actors
- Capable of evaluating alternative strategic courses of action
- Imbued with enhanced cultural awareness of key regions to include an understanding of the dynamics of the international strategic environment and geostrategic relationships
- Better able to lead others, due to practicing the craft of writing clearly and speaking articulately about operations, grand strategy, and policy
- Capable of understanding the importance of strategic communication
- Empowered with analytical frameworks to support policy and strategy decision making
- Capable of fully understanding a range of classical and contemporary strategic concepts
- Aware of critical thinking and decision making by real-world, strategic leaders
- Improved in ability for strategic-level problem solving, creative thinking, and risk management

Course Requirements

Graduate students are expected to demonstrate successfully abilities to do excellent research and to do advanced and original analysis.

15 page research paper: 40% of the final grade.

In-class final examination: 40% of the final grade.

Class contribution: 20% of the final grade.

Class discussions are bound by the principles and practices of academic freedom, tolerance of opposing views, and civility. The rule of non-attribution is to be observed by all; that is, the views expressed by participants in the class--instructor, students, and guest lecturers if any--are not to be disseminated outside the classroom. And that means no recordings.

Required Course Books (11)

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey: 1976).

Julian Stafford Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press Edition, 1988.

Gordon Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964,

John Lewis Gaddis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*. Revised and expanded edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* [1964]. Westport CT: Praeger, 2006.

John Keegan, *The Second World War.* New York: Penguin, 2005.

Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Col. Qiao Liang and Col. Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* [Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1999]; Dehradum, India: Natraj Publishers, 2007, ed. Albert Santoli.

Mao Tse Tung, *Guerrilla Warfare* [1937], trans. Samuel B. Griffith. Published versions include the USMC's Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 12-18: *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare.*

Peter Paret, ed., M*akers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age.* Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1986.

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford University Press, New York: [1963] 1980).

One copy of each is on the course reserve shelf in our library, and area libraries may also carry some. Nearly all these books are available in paperback on the second-hand market.
Course Reader: many articles and chapters not shown above are *assigned and are available on the library's drive for #628.*

Course Outline

Class 1: Introduction to Strategy and the Strategic Way of Thinking

General. Strategy has been viewed traditionally as the relationship between war's purpose and the means to achieve this political end. Strategy provides a theory of victory that explains how a state can translate the employment of the specific means of military operations into the achievement of overall national objectives. In addition, "grand" strategy must take into account long-term competitions in war and peace, and therefore must also consider non-military elements of state power and the use of "soft power" in international affairs.

In preparing for each seminar it is helpful to keep in mind these six basic course themes (imported from the Strategy Department of the Naval War College): Pre-war assessment. Policy & Strategy match--or mismatch. Adequacy of Strategy. Civil-Military relations. Coalition War and the International Environment. War Termination, including comparison between pre-war plans and post-war results.

Discussion questions

What is strategy?

What are the factors that influence the strategy of a state?

Does a nation or a state have a "strategic culture"? If so, provide some examples.

Readings For the first class, in addition to this syllabus, students should have read:

Mackubin T. Owens, "Strategy and the Strategic Way of Thinking" (2007). E-Reserve.

Owens, "In Defense of Classical Geopolitics" (1999) E-Reserve

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, pp. 63-149 of Griffith edn.

Class 2: On Strategy: Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and the Development of Strategic Thought

General.   How do theories of war fit into considerations of strategy? Theory is a way of organizing our thinking about real world phenomena. Consider this syllogism. If one wants to act effectively in the real world of war, one must be able to think productively. To think productively, one must be able to organize his or her mind properly. To organize one's mind properly, they have to assimilate useful concepts, broad perspectives, relevant considerations, and leading questions. The course themes supply the questions. The case studies, with their range of historical and contemporary experience, provide a broad perspective on current strategic problems and reveal patterns that may have some predictive value for the future. The theorists whom we study offer the concepts that shape our understanding of war and international competition and help guide our selection of strategic courses of action in war and peace.

To whom should we turn for theoretical guidance? There are no better places to start than with Carl von Clausewitz's *On War* and Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. Both texts still provide solid conceptual foundations for understanding war, strategy, and leadership. The authors were primarily concerned with the intellectual development of military officers, whom they identified as vital to the security of the state. Both expected their students to use their minds critically and creatively. Clausewitz was systematic in his approach, whereas Sun Tzu was suggestive, and the two were representatives of very different cultures. Each, however, took strategic logic in distinctive directions, and in ways that give us important ideas to use in this course and in the real world.

Discussion Questions

How does Clausewitz define war?

Clausewitz emphasizes the primacy of politics in waging war. "Policy," he states, "will permeate all military operations." At the same time, he notes that "the political aim is not a tyrant," that political considerations do not determine "the posting of guards," and that "policy will not extend its influence to operational details." How can we reconcile the first statement with the last three?

Does Clausewitz's view of the proper relationship between war and politics differ from that offered by Sun Tzu in *The Art of War*?

The authors of *The Art of War* and *On War* agree that, although war can be studied systematically, strategic leadership is an art, not a science. What are the implications of this proposition for the study of strategy and policy?

Among Clausewitz's most important concepts are "the culminating point of victory," "the center of gravity," and "the need to be strong at the decisive point." How useful are such concepts for political and military leaders? Are they as valuable on the strategic level as they are on the operational level?

Clausewitz emphasizes the need to understand the importance of three interrelated aspects of war: reason, passion, and the play of chance and creativity. What is the role of each in war, and how do they interact?

The Art of War says that "to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill," while Clausewitz states that very limited and defensive objectives might be secured by the mere deployment of force. Are these two statements contradictory or complementary?

In Chapter 1 of Book 1 of *On War*, Clausewitz makes a distinction: "War in theory" tends to escalate until all the available forces are used. But in reality, or in practice, most wars are waged with less than total effort, he argues. What should we make of this paradox?

Clausewitz, on page 69 of *On War*, recognizes two kinds of war, involving a limited or unlimited objective. How do they differ from each other?

Evaluate the role of intelligence in *The Art of War* and *On War* [e.g. pp. 84 and 117 in Clausewitz]. Which view is more relevant today? If you are a veteran, which view seems more accurate?

Some have suggested that technological advances may soon lift the "fog of war" completely, thus invalidating certain of Clausewitz's most important insights. Do you agree?

Which theorist do you regard as more relevant to the current conflicts, Clausewitz or Sun Tzu?

Contemporary writers on strategy emphasize the growth of violence by non- state actors since 1945, suggesting that such conflicts cannot be evaluated by reference to Clausewitz's trinity. Do you agree?

One of the preferred strategies presented in *The Art of War* is to disrupt an enemy's alliances, and Clausewitz argues that an ally can sometimes be the enemy's center of gravity. How, and to what extent, do these insights relate to twenty first century conflicts?

What is Clausewitz's definition of "military genius"? How does it differ from the vision of strategic leadership in *The Art of War,* or from your own view of leadership?

Both *On War* and *The Art of War* were written in response to revolutionary changes in the nature of warfare. Which text is the better guide for political and military leaders attempting to anticipate and manage change during peace between major wars?

On p. 131, Clausewitz states "we clearly see that the activities characteristic of war may be split into two main categories: *those that are merely preparation for war, and war proper*." Does this mean that strategic principles do not apply in peacetime? Would Sun Tzu agree?

Do *On War* and *The Art of War* provide much guidance for using information as an instrument of national power?

What is "grand strategy?" How useful are Clausewitz and Sun Tzu for thinking about *grand* strategy? Why?

Sun Tzu argues that attacking an enemy's strategy and disrupting an enemy's alliances are the two preferred means of winning conflicts. Can this analysis be applied to an enemy "grand strategy"? Can these techniques be used in peacetime as well as in war?

Readings

Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. Author's Preface, Comment and Notes; Book 1;

Book 2, Chapters 1-3, 5-6; Book 3; Book 4, Chapter 11; Book 5, Chapter 3; Book 6, Chapters 1, 5, 6, 26, 27; Book 7, Chapters 2-5, 22; Book 8.

Also recommended:
Antoine-Henri Jomini, *The Art of War* [1838], chapters I-IV, summary and supplement.

Makers of Modern Strategy, chapter 7.

Class 3: Napoleon and the European Transformation of War

General. The 18th century saw a substantial revolution in warfare, resulting primarily from the rise of the Westphalian nation-state and its domination of the international political system, the creation of standing armies, and technological change. This period manifests the rise of the "Great Captains," military leaders such as Frederick the Great and the Duke of Marlborough.

The French Revolution constituted another transformative era. Following the French Revolution, Napoleon Bonaparte dominated military affairs in Europe for two decades. He was able to do so by tapping the manpower potential unleashed by the French Revolution and bending it to his purpose of continental domination. Thus he was able to created huge armies and employ innovative organizational changes to handily defeat armies of the sort that had been successful in the time of Frederick the Great. Napoleon replaced dynastic wars limited in both ends and means with wars of unlimited goals.

Napoleon can be said to have created the operational level of war, i.e. the employment of maneuvers, battles, and logistics support to achieve strategic success within a theater of war. But his military success was frequently undone by his political and strategic overreaching, which had the effect of uniting his enemies.

Discussion questions

What were the dominant characteristics of war in Europe during the 18th century?

This period, before the French Revolution, is said to be a time of "limited war." In what respect were wars limited?

How would you describe a campaign during the 18th century? In today's parlance, how does a "campaign" differ from a "war"?

What was "the French Revolution"? Why does it matter regarding the character of wars?

Napoleon achieved remarkable successes during 1805-1807. Why was he not able to duplicate these successes in 1812-1815?

Did Napoleon ever win any decisive battles?

In fighting France, which factor was most important for Britain, its military and naval instruments of war or its economic power?

Which was more important for Napoleon's defeat: the Emperor's self- defeating actions or British strategic performance?

How was Napoleon finally defeated? What role did coalitions play in his defeat?

Readings

Makers of Modern Strategy, chapters 4, 5, 6.

Class 4: Sea Power and Strategy

General. Winning mastery of the seas, and the strategic effects a country derives from exercising command of the maritime commons, provide the principal subjects in grand strategy examined in this case study. Critical thinking about the particular problems and opportunities in strategy and policy faced by a maritime state is facilitated through the study of the innovative strategic thinkers, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett, who extend the theory of war into the maritime environment. Corbett and Mahan explain how controlling the maritime domain contributes to winning wars and shaping the international environment. They also provide key analytical concepts.

From its opening pages on Rome's contest with Carthage, Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History* is a classic study of sea power and grand strategy. One of Mahan's contemporaries, Sir Julian Corbett, adds additional theoretical insights by exploring how maritime powers can use limited war and peripheral operations to obtain strategic effects. Corbett recognizes that land and naval forces working in concert toward a single objective multiplies the strength of a maritime state. In addition to the maritime theorists, this case focuses on the economic dimension of strategy, operational versus strategic leadership, and coalition warfare. Both these authors continue to influence strategic thinking and policy-making.

Discussion Questions

How do the views of Mahan and Corbett regarding sea power differ?

Corbett explicitly invokes Clausewitz in explaining maritime strategy. How does he utilize and expand Clausewitz's understanding of war?

Assessing risk versus reward is a difficult strategic problem. Mahan maintained that Great Britain's leaders should have run greater risks in using their naval forces during the War for American Independence. Do you agree with Mahan's assessment that British leaders should have adopted a more aggressive stance for employing their fleet from 1778 to 1781, much as Britain would later do when it fought against the French Republic and Napoleon?

Several scholars including Corbett have argued that Great Britain's efforts in the Iberian "Peninsula War" (1807-1814) were essential to Napoleon's final defeat. Do you agree?

How strategically important were operations in <u>secondary</u> theaters for determining the outcome of the wars examined in this case?

Can sea power alone be "decisive"? Why or why not? [Note: we have no assigned reading on the Battle of Trafalgar, 1805, but discussion of that or any other examples is welcome.]

Dominant maritime powers often try to shift the burden of ground fighting onto their coalition partners. What steps can a maritime power take to overcome problems of burden sharing and prevent a coalition from falling apart?

Which theorist does a more effective job explaining the outcome of the wars, Alfred Thayer Mahan or Sir Julian Corbett?

Which of these two theorists do you suppose is more valuable for the 21st century?

Readings

A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*. Preface; Introductory; Chapters 1 and 14. Shelf Reserve, and E-Reserve.

Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* [1911]. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press Edition, 1988. Part I: Theory of War, pp. 3 – 87; Appendix: War Course: Notes on Strategy [1909], pp. 326 – 345. .

Makers of Modern Strategy, ch. 16 on Mahan, by Phillip Crowl.

Class 5: The American Civil War

General. The American Civil War is a pivotal event in American strategic culture, providing an example of what has come to be called the "American way of war." The strategic situation confronting Lincoln required the mobilization of large armies and naval forces to overthrow the Confederacy. At the outset of the struggle to restore the Union, the interrelationship of the war's purpose, cost, and duration confounded the best strategic analyses.

Lincoln had stormy relationships with the generals. The critical role played by civil-military relations in the making of strategy thus forms an integral part of this case study. Perhaps no case study in civil-military relations shines as bright a spotlight on the strategic consequences of the relationship between the statesman and the soldier. This case study shows how strategic choices, for good or ill, result from the actions of decision makers and their staffs who bring differing bureaucratic backgrounds, strategic conceptions, and personalities to their deliberations.

The story is often told of Lincoln's travails in finding a military high command willing to work with him to develop and execute a coherent strategy for overthrowing the Confederacy and breaking the will to fight of the people of the South.

Emergence of Ulysses S. Grant, first as a general in the Western theater and later as commander of the entire Union effort, gave Lincoln a military leader who saw the strategic contours of the war as he did. Grant was skilled at maneuver warfare. His offensives were meant to seize the strategic initiative and gain the war's objectives. The Union offensives of 1864 were designed to be a coordinated, multi-theater drive to end the war by taking advantage of the North's superiority in numbers and naval forces. This sound strategic blueprint, however, did not prove easy to execute. Defeating Lee's army and taking the South's capital of Richmond took almost a year of hard fighting and enormous casualties. Grant's offensive in the main theater of war in Virginia was complemented by the drive of General William Tecumseh Sherman into Georgia, with follow-on operations in the Carolinas. Sherman's offensive into the Confederate homeland did serious damage to the South's ability to wage war. These two offensives, Grant's drive into Virginia and Sherman's march through the South, broke the Confederacy's capacity to wage a conventional war.

Discussion questions

Is there an "American way of war"?

If you had served as a foreign correspondent for a newspaper covering the American Civil War, how would you have assessed the prospects of the two sides shortly after the First Battle of Bull Run?

Lincoln has a reputation of being an outstanding war leader. So why did Lincoln find it so difficult to work with his generals in the making of strategy and the execution of operations? Did Lincoln ask more of his generals than they could reasonably be expected to deliver in their operations?

The lethality of the weaponry employed during the American Civil War conferred important advantages to the defender on the battlefield. Yet, the war was won by the side that resorted to the offensive in pursuit of its overarching political aims. Why did the defense not prove the stronger form of war in the conflicts examined in this case study?

Lincoln's reelection in November 1864 did not bring about an immediate end to the fighting, despite the very low probability of Confederate success. Was it rational for the leaders of the Confederacy to continue fighting for as long as they did?

What strategic effect did <u>irregular</u> warfare have in shaping the outcome of the American Civil War?

One military historian has written: "Lee was not really a strategist, though he was a brilliant tactician and operational leader." Do you agree?

Sun Tzu presents a model of effective strategic leadership in *The Art of War*. Does President Lincoln represent this type of leader?

Grant is lauded as a great field commander. How well did he manage the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chaos of war?

Did the North "win the peace" after the conclusion of the American Civil War?

Readings

President of the United States of America: First Inaugural Address, 4 March 1861; The Emancipation Proclamation, 1 January 1863; The Gettysburg Address, 19 November 1863; and Second Inaugural Address, 4 March 1865. E-Reserve, and available online at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/lincoln/.

Makers of Modern Strategy, chapter 15 by Russell Weigley.

Owens, "Abraham Lincoln as War President: Practical Wisdom at War." E-Reserve.

Also Recommended:
James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Class 6: The Prussian School and the Wars of German Unification

General. Wars announced the emergence of the German Empire during the nineteenth century. The North German state of Prussia fought three wars—the Danish War of 1864, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870- 1871—to forge a united Germany under its rule.

Otto von Bismarck was the policy and strategy architect of these "Wars of German Unification." While serving as the Prussian Minister-President, Bismarck showed himself a master at managing the delicate policy-strategy relationship in regional wars fought for limited aims to make Prussia the dominant power in Germany. Bismarck understood that in order to defeat Prussia's rivals in war, he needed to calibrate objectives, to integrate military operations and diplomacy, and to balance the triangular relationship among the people, government, and army.

Bismarck faced and took great risks in pursuing his strategy of unifying Germany under Prussian rule through limited war with its great power neighbors. There was always the danger of defeat on the battlefield, protracted war, or escalation to a wider, general European conflict. Bismarck sought to control the escalatory dangers of ever more ambitious war aims and great-power intervention against Prussia. The study of Bismarck provides timely insights into the making of policy and strategy by a country that sought to challenge the international status quo without provoking escalation to a wider, general war.

As Bismarck gained an ascendancy over the government's internal foes, he faced a stiff challenge to his authority on matters of war and peace from the Prussian military establishment. In particular, Bismarck needed to assert control over the Prussian general staff, headed by the skilled military leader Helmuth von Moltke. The disagreements between Bismarck and Moltke during the Wars of German Unification provide an invaluable opportunity to examine civil-military relations. These disagreements threatened to upset Bismarck's political calculations and impair Prussia's strategic effectiveness.

Discussion questions

Some strategic analysts argue that Bismarck's success was largely the product of his own skill. Others argue that the keys to his success were a permissive domestic and international environment, "cooperative" adversaries, and good luck. Of these, which element seems most important?

Was Bismarck an "opportunist" or a man with a long-term plan?

Who better understood the proper relationship between political and military authorities during the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars: Bismarck or Moltke?

Assess the validity of the following statement. "Politics and strategy are radically and fundamentally things apart. Strategy begins where politics ends. All that soldiers ask is that once the policy is settled, strategy and command shall be regarded as something in a sphere apart from politics. . . . The line of demarcation must be drawn between politics and strategy, supply, and operations. Having found this line, all sides must abstain from trespassing."

At the end of our brief study of these Germany's wars of unification, do you suspect that country had developed momentum for engaging in aggressive expansion in the impending 20th century? Or is that an unreasonable analytical leap?

Readings

Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 281-295.

Gordon Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army*, pp. 136-216.

Also Recommended:
Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Pages 103-136.

Class 7: World War I and Land Warfare

General. Examining great-power grand strategies from a hundred years ago provides a lens for assessing the dynamic changes taking place in today's international environment. Do shifts in the relative strength of major powers produce conflict, as Thucydides contended in his classic

history of the Spartan-Athenian war? Or is it possible to manage major shifts in the international balance of power without war?

The breakdown of the globalized international order of a hundred years ago amidst a catastrophic world war provides a warning for contemporary leaders and strategic analysts. The First World War resulted in horrendous loss of life as well as political and social upheaval. The German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires collapsed, leaving power vacuums in Europe and the Middle East. These outcomes were not what leaders who embarked on the war had foreseen or wanted—underscoring a classic strategic issue of how pre-war plans pair with post-war results. The scope of this war—and the later literature about it—is immense; we will concentrate on major strategies for land warfare, and to a degree on ground fighting.

Discussion Questions

Why did Germany, which had made remarkable economic gains during the period of peace before 1914, go to war against Great Britain and eventually the United States?

Did Great Britain commit a major policy and strategy error by going to war against imperial Germany in August 1914?

A noted historian of the First World War contends that Germany's naval buildup under Wilhelm II was the fundamental cause of the Anglo-German conflict. Do you agree?

German admirals of the era were reading Alfred Thayer Mahan. But, were his strategic theories becoming irrelevant even then, as he developed them? How influential was sea power on the outcome of the First World War?

Were any realistic alternative courses of action open to German leaders in January 1917 that would have been superior to unrestricted submarine warfare?

Why did Germany find itself bogged down in a protracted war of attrition during the First World War, in stark contrast to the quick Prussian victories in the Wars of German Unification?

How might British and German decision makers at the beginning of the twentieth century have benefited from a close study of the strategic lessons of the American Civil War?

Germany and Great Britain launched major offensives on the Western Front during the First World War that proved very costly in loss of life. Were these ground offensives strategic blunders?

Imperial Germany provides a glaring example of a breakdown in the proper relationship between political and military leaders in the making of policy and strategy. Why did this breakdown occur, and what were its strategic consequences?

How rational, or irrational, was the failure of the major powers to negotiate an early end to the fighting during the First World War?

Please look up Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and then assess the following assertion: "President Wilson never had realistic war aims, or the ability to execute them."

Which coalition was more strategically dysfunctional during the First World War—the Central Powers or the Allied and Associated Powers?

Leading maritime powers often try to shift the burden of ground fighting onto their coalition partners. What general conclusions can one draw from the efforts of Great Britain in this era to overcome problems of burden sharing and prevent a coalition from falling apart?

Readings

Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: Random House, 1987. Pages 194- 274. E-Reserve.

Hew Strachan, *The First World War*. New York: Viking, 2004, pp. Pages 33-64 and 97-340. E-Reserve.

Makers of Modern Strategy, chapters 17-19.

Also recommended:
Two recent films: the documentary "They Shall Not Grow Old," and the drama "1917."

Kennedy, Paul M., ed., *The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914*.
London: George Allen and Unwin, 1979. Pages 75-98 and 171-198.

Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Pp. 29-55 and 168-217.

Craig, Gordon A. *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pages 273-354.

Class 8: World War II and the Rise of Air Power

General. The carnage of the Great War led some to consider ways of avoiding war on the ground, especially the trench warfare that characterized the Western Front. By 1918, several individuals were looking to the potential of the airplane to accomplish this. Italy's Giulio Douhet was one who believed that massive air fleets could overfly the battlefield and directly attack the enemy's strategic center of gravity. On the one hand, these schemes anticipated gas and high explosive used against populations. On the other hand, some hoped these ugly prospects might deter war altogether. Of course, airpower did no such thing; airpower contributed to massive destruction during the Second World War, mankind's deadliest.

A series of global conflicts—World War I, World War II, and the Cold War—marked the history of the twentieth century. The outcome of each struggle helped to generate the origins of the next,

and each new one grew larger than the previous one in geographical scope. Within this pattern, there were radical changes in the character of war brought on by new forms of political organization and novel military technology and doctrine.

The new forms of political organization that shaped World War II and the Cold War grew in part out of the First World War and its aftermath. Totalitarian regimes emerged, in both fascist and communist variants. Externally, the ideologies of these governments encouraged grandiose expansionist objectives. Internally, they sought to control their societies in ways that seemed to make them well-suited to wage wars of maximum effort against their external adversaries. For the United States and its allies, World War II was a struggle against the fascist variants of the new totalitarian forms of political organization. The Cold War that followed became a struggle against the communist variants.

Discussion Questions

What impact did Douhet and other airpower advocates have on the national strategies of Germany, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States?

Can airpower be independently decisive? Why or why not?

How effective were the bombing campaigns of Britain (nighttime bombing) and the United States (daylight bombing) respectively

What are the moral implications of attacking cities by air?

Compare the arguments on behalf of strategic bombing vs. cooperation between air and ground components.

Historian William O'Neill calls air power "the democratic delusion." Is that assessment justified by the evidence of World War II?

General George Marshall wrote to General Dwight Eisenhower in March 1945: "Making war in a democracy is not a bed of roses." In World War II what strategic advantages did the United States gain, and what strategic disadvantages did it suffer, from having a democratic political system?

What strategic advantages did Hitler and Stalin gain and what strategic disadvantages did they suffer from, being dictators?

In World War II, who struck the better balance between short-term military considerations and longer-term political considerations – the United States or the Soviet Union?

Could the Axis have defeated the Grand Alliance in World War II? If so, how? If not, why not?

In global wars, the decision to open or contest a new theater may be of great strategic consequence. In the period from 1940 to 1945, identify one such decision that brought major,

positive consequences and another that did not have positive consequences. Why were the strategic consequences different in the two cases?

In 1942-1945 did American military operations in or across the Pacific undercut the Europe-first geostrategic priority of the United States?

Leading maritime powers often try to shift the burden of ground fighting onto their coalition partners. What general conclusions can one draw from the efforts of the United States and Britain in World War II to overcome problems of burden sharing and prevent a coalition from falling apart?

Readings

Makers of Modern Strategy, chapters 21, 23, 24.

John Keegan, *World War II*. New York: Penguin, 2005; selections by each student, e.g. on air war, or on the Soviet front.

Also recommended:

Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air* [2nd. edn. 1927]. New York: Books Express Publ., 2013.

Christopher C. Harmon, "Are We Beasts? Churchill and Moral Question of World War II 'Area Bombing'," *Newport Papers #1* (Naval War College, Newport RI) 1991. E-Reserve and available on the web.

Class 9: The Cold War and Nuclear Strategy

General. After its success during World War II, the Grand Alliance broke down. What had been a four-year pattern of cooperation in the rise of American and Soviet power turned into a four-decade pattern of conflict. Attempting to enhance their security as well as to expand their ideological sway, the Soviets threatened the hard-won security of the Western democracies. Though not wanting to risk a war at a time when the United States had an atomic monopoly and the Soviet economy had not yet recovered from the impact of the German invasion, Stalin was nevertheless looking to extend the span of communist political control in Europe, Southwest Asia, and Northeast Asia.

In 1948, retired American diplomat William Bullitt wrote two articles for a widely-read magazine on "How We Won the War and Lost the Peace." By then there were major American efforts to prevent further deterioration of the situation especially in Europe. Another American diplomat, George Kennan, had already developed a concept of "containment" of the Soviet Union and had also pushed for a program of economic aid that came to fruition as the Marshall Plan. Diplomatic negotiations were under way to form NATO and establish a West German state.

Just as the European situation seemed to be stabilizing, the Soviet detonation of a nuclear device and the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949 delivered new jolts to American strategic leaders. Paul Nitze led an interagency committee that called for major rearmament to bring American military capabilities in line with the policy of containment. President Truman, while determined to see the United States develop a thermonuclear capability before the Soviets did, was reluctant for fiscal reasons to reverse the postwar downsizing of conventional forces until he was further surprised. Confronted by the Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, the Truman administration decided to intervene in a regional war within the larger Cold War and found itself fighting not only the Soviet client state of North Korea but also the newest and most important Soviet ally, Mao Tse- Tung's China.

Facing this new challenge across the Pacific, and fearing follow-on Soviet aggression in Europe, Truman authorized a rapid military buildup, half of which was directed to Western Europe and half to East Asia. NATO became a full-fledged military alliance under American leadership in 1951, and the United States impressed on Britain and France its desire to bring the recently constituted and a soon-to-be-rearmed Federal Republic of Germany into this alliance. Germany's former Axis partner Japan also became a formal ally of the United States. By 1953, when the American presidency passed to Eisenhower and Stalin passed away, the two new superpowers had each constructed their own militarized coalitions in Europe and Asia and were embarked on a global strategic competition that featured the heavy use of all instruments of national power and the risk of mutual thermonuclear destruction.

Discussion Questions

In 1944 and 1945, most American strategic leaders expected a cooperative relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States to continue in the postwar era. Did Stalin have a similar view, or not? Why were U.S. expectations not fulfilled?

As the Cold War emerged, who did the better job of assessing adversaries—the United States or the Soviet Union?

What general conclusions can one judiciously draw from the 1940 to 1953 period about the elements that make for a strategically effective multinational coalition?

What was the American policy called "containment"? Does American strategic performance from 1940 to 1953 represent a good model for the integration of different instruments of national power?

Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. emerged, in the years after 1945, as stronger than when they entered World War Two. How do we explain this?

What difference did the existence of nuclear weapons make for the policy and strategy of the United States and its Communist adversaries from 1945 to 1953?

What were Washington's conceptions for using nuclear weapons during the Cold War, and how much did those ideas change?

Apparently by a large majority, America's scientific community was skeptical of, or opposed to, the 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative. Were the reasons strategic, technical, financial, or something else? Were the critics right?

The United States entered into Cold War alliances with Japan and West Germany. What best accounts for the realignment of the two main Axis powers after World War II – American policy and strategy, Soviet policy and strategy, or the Germans and Japanese themselves?

Readings

Gaddis, John Lewis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*. Revised and expanded edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Chapters 5, 6, 7.

Makers of Modern Strategy, chapters 22, 25.

Also recommended:
Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Harold W. Rood, *Kingdoms of the Blind*. Carolina Academic Press, 1980 [out of print].

Class 10: Irregular War and Asia

General. How should one account both for the stunning Communist rise in China and for the party's dramatic ups and downs after its founding in 1921? One likely explanation lies in the theory of revolutionary warfare pieced together by Mao Tse-tung from 1926 to 1938. A powerful model of insurgency, it combined political mobilization and military operations into a "theory of victory" for how to go "from nothing to everything" in China and later in other agrarian societies.

From 1945 to 1979 Southeast Asia was one of the most violent regions in the world. Although some of its warfare featured states fighting states, most took place within political systems. Every country in the region, except Singapore, was convulsed by internal wars, most more than once. There were violent uprisings against Western colonial systems (Vietnam and Indonesia); there were Communist insurgencies (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia); there was organized violence arising from ethnic and religious divisions (Malaya, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Laos); and there were coups and counter-coups (Thailand, Burma, South Vietnam, and Cambodia). In 1965, there was a massive repression of an attempted coup in Indonesia, where several hundred thousand Communists and ethnic Chinese died. The Communist regime in Laos conducted chemical attacks against an ethnic minority, while the Cambodian Maoist regime slaughtered at least one-fifth of its own population. At the end of this era, in 1979, communist China attacked communist Vietnam, in a bloody border war.

Discussion Questions

In what ways does Mao's theory of war resemble the theories of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, and where does it add something genuinely new and important?

The Chinese Communists experienced many "ups and downs" on their road to power in China. What enabled them to be so resilient after their major setbacks (1927, 1934-1935, November 1945-May 1946)?

Did it make strategic sense for the United States to extend the policy of containment to Vietnam and make it a major new military theater in the larger Cold War?

To what extent did actual Communist strategy in the Vietnamese/American war follow Mao's theoretical model of revolutionary insurgency?

How effectively did the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong combine conventional, guerrilla, terrorist, and information operations?

Why did the United States fail in Vietnam, especially since it had made containment work in Korea in the previous decade?

Was the Communist victory in Vietnam due mostly to North Vietnamese strategy, inherent weaknesses of the South Vietnamese government, or strategic mistakes of the United States?

Would better integration of and coordination among the instruments of national power have allowed the United States to win in Vietnam?

How important were civil-military relations in determining the success or failure of the American war effort in Vietnam?

Given the political restraints placed on his ground operations, General Westmoreland believed that there were no good alternatives to the strategy of attrition that he pursued from 1965 to 1968. Do you agree?

Could the United States have better used air power to win in Vietnam? If so, how? If not, why not?

Some have argued that the Tet offensive in 1968 was a major strategic mistake by the Communists that the United States and South Vietnam did not exploit effectively. Do you agree?

"It is hard to see how any administration coming to power in 1968 could have pushed harder against the basic trend of American public opinion, kept the war going longer, fought it better or got an agreement fundamentally more favorable to Saigon than the one that emerged." Do you agree?

Which theorist—Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, or Mao—provides the best insight into Communist victory and U.S. defeat in Vietnam?

What does the Southeast Asia experience suggest are the most important mistakes that incumbent governments and coalitions may make in countering an insurgency, and how can insurgents most effectively capitalize upon them?

On the basis of the insurgencies covered here, what attributes of strategic leadership would you judge to be the most important on the counterinsurgent side?

How important was assistance from outside powers—especially China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States—in determining the outcome of the conflicts examined in this module of the course?

"It wasn't so much they [the military leadership] resented civilian oversight– they just didn't feel we were competent to question it," SECDEF McNamara later said of top military commanders in Vietnam. "And to a considerable degree, they were right. But they should have recognized, even if we weren't experts in military operations, the questions we raised were fundamental. And they should have been willing to reexamine their actions in relation to those fundamental questions, and most of them were not." Do you agree with this assessment of American strategic decision making during the Vietnam War?

How does this war end?

Readings

Mao Tse Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare* [1937]. E-Reserve, and available on the web.

Mao Tse Tung, "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan (May 1938), c. 30 pp. E-Reserve, and on the web, as at:
www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_08.htm

Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. Pp. 3 - 222.

Class 11: Terrorism and the French Algerian War

General. France conquered Algeria in the 1830s and proclaimed it an integral part of France in 1847, a status which made it more precious than colonies. Yet the French state treated Muslim inhabitants of Algeria, numbering eight-and-a-half million by 1954, more as subjects than citizens. Political and economic power was concentrated in the hands of the European settlers, the "pieds noirs," a community of approximately one million people. A small group of Algerian nationalists established an organization to fight for Algeria's independence, launching an offensive on 1 November 1954. The French responded with martial law, repression, and a military buildup that eventually committed about half of the regular army to the counterinsurgency. France smashed the FLN's urban infrastructure in 1957 during the Battle of

Algiers, and isolated the rural battlefield by erecting extensive fortified barriers that cut the Algerian insurgents off from their bases and sanctuaries in Morocco and Tunisia. After 1959, FLN fighters, as one historian writes, "did not appear in the countryside in units larger than company size."

From the military point of view, the FLN had been beaten. Yet military defeat did not preclude political victory. The great French leader during the Second World War, General Charles de Gaulle, who owed his political comeback in 1958 to the Algerian crisis, concluded that it was in France's best interest to grant Algeria its independence. De Gaulle won a national referendum on the question of Algerian self-determination and negotiated France's withdrawal in 1962. This conflict dating from the colonial era holds valuable lessons of contemporary relevance.

There are fundamental strategic questions about terrorism, including the strategic logic of terrorism, whether it can be deterred, how groups that use terror can be defeated, and particular issues of America's fight against terror in the 21st century. But our lens for examining terrorism is an insurgent and nationalist war between Algeria's National Liberation Front and the security forces of France. The use of terror and torture was common on both sides and raises both questions of strategy and of ethical decision-making in the profession of arms.

FLN used terror against its own countrymen, against European settlers, and to damage chosen targets. The Front achieved substantial success, but the degree to which terrorism proved to be the means of that success is debatable. A study of the French-Algerian War might well focus on rationality: At the strategic level, is terror a rational strategy or the irrational, tactical tool of extremists driven by blind passion? What is terror meant to achieve? Is there an underlying rationality to the use of terror that observers and theorists would recognize? This case considers the use of terror for different reasons, as well as providing insight into strategies for defeating, dismantling, or disrupting the activities of terrorist groups.

The strategic logic of terror includes its intangible effects produced by attacks. Clausewitz reminds us that in a net assessment of our adversaries and allies, we must consider not just the tangible elements as measured in their capabilities, but also the intangibles—such as their will and their ability to affect the will of others. Indeed the French- Algerian War shows how terror has been used to bolster or undermine the will of an adversary. The case also presents different facets of how terror groups have used their ability to create fear, hatred, and enmity to their advantage. Finally, it presents a variety of reactions—often overreactions—by states and highlight the consequences of allowing passion to overrule strategic logic. It is also important to examine how terror fits within larger strategies. According to the United States Department of Defense, terrorism is: "The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political." In the Algerian study, terror was used to expel colonial overlords, spark revolution, kill political and ethnic rivals, and gain a seat in the political process, among other reasons.

The week's reading also opens questions about counterterrorism strategies. When insurgents use terror, do they not expose some of their own vulnerabilities? Are there specific economic, political, social, and military counter-strategies that contend well against terrorist groups? What

are the roles of economic reform, intelligence, infiltration, police investigations, targeted violence, and the legal system in countering terror? Conversely, can we identify self-defeating strategic behavior by government forces that may undermine state objectives and contribute to popular alienation?

Discussion Questions

What strategies did France use in this war in Algeria?

What French strategies proved most effective in countering FLN terrorism?

How much did self-defeating and/or unethical behavior on the part of the French contribute to their defeat?

Was the outcome of Algerian independence from France practically inevitable? Or, did alternative policies and strategies exist that would have produced a markedly different outcome?

What circumstances contribute to the successful outcome of strategies that incorporate terrorism?

How do terrorists shape their campaigns to attract formal or informal support from abroad?

What are the weaknesses of terrorism as an instrument of mass political mobilization?

How can a terrorist organization best exploit a government's political or military reaction against it?

How are the insurgent and terrorist strategies examined in this 1954-1962 case similar to or dissimilar from the classical Maoist strategy of people's war?

How useful is Clausewitzian "triangular" analysis for understanding the outcomes of the conflicts studied this week?

How useful is Sun Tzu's theory of war for understanding the outcomes of the terrorist campaigns explored this week?

Speaking of today, what might be the most useful indicators of strategic success for counterterrorists?

What are the most useful indicators of strategic success for terrorists?

Are tangible or intangible factors more important in countering groups that use terror? Why?

How can a government's political and military reaction best respond to the surprise and uncertainty inherent in a strategy that uses terror?

What vulnerabilities do terror groups have and what strategies can states use to take advantage of those vulnerabilities?

Readings

Horne, Alistair. *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*. [1987]. New York: New York Review of Books, 2006. Pp. 183-230. Shelf Reserve, and E-Reserve.

Matthew Connelly, "Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grand Strategy of the Algerian War for Independence," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 33, no. 2 (May 2001). Pages 221-245. http://www.jstor.org/stable/259563. E-Reserve

David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. New York: Praeger, 2006.

Also recommended:

Martha Crenshaw, *Revolutionary Terrorism*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978. Shelf Reserve.

Martha Crenshaw, "The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War," in Martha Crenshaw, ed. *Terrorism in Context*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995. Pp. 473-513.

Christopher C. Harmon, "What History Suggests About Terrorism and Its Future," in *The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession,* eds. Williamson Murray and Richard H. Sinnreich. Cambridge University Press, Spring 2006. E-Reserve.

Paul Aussaresses, *The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter- Terrorism in Algeria 1955-1957*. Robert L. Miller, trans. New York: Enigma Books, 2002. Pp. 118-166.

Class 12: Independent Study.
Individual consultations on research/term papers at IWP with the professor.

Class 13: Military Power, Strategy, and Future Security Challenges

General. Part of preparing for war is to understand it. What is the permanent nature of war? What is the character of today's war? Will war in the future be like war in the past? These are critical questions that today's strategists must attempt to answer. Unfortunately, our track record is not very good. To envision the future is to "look through a glass darkly."

A case in point is the debate that took place a decade ago in the wake of the Cold War's end and Operation DESERT STORM, the First Gulf War, of 1991. After that conflict, many contended that while conflict was still possible, it would differ from war in the past. This view took two forms. On the one hand were the *technological optimists*, who believed that the United States

could maintain its dominant position in the international order by exploiting the "revolution in military affairs" (RMA). On the other were the *technological pessimists*, who rejected the idea of a technological "golden city of guaranteed strategic riches." The rapid coalition victory over Saddam Hussein that drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait led some influential defense experts to argue that emerging technologies and the RMA had the potential to transform the very nature of war. One advocate of this position was Admiral William Owens, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1994 to 1996, who contended that these emerging technologies and "information dominance" would eliminate "friction" and the "fog of war," providing the commander and his subordinates nearly perfect "situational awareness," thereby promising "the capacity to use military force without the same risks as before." Owens argued that "technology could enable U.S. military forces in the future to lift the 'fog of war.' . . . [B]attlefield dominant awareness—the ability to see and understand everything the ability to see and understand everything on the battlefield—might be possible." Furthermore, "if you see the battlefield, you will win the war."

Discussion Questions

Has the nature of war changed? Why or why not?

The Clausewitzian "trinity" displays war as a domain of primordial violence, chance, and uncertainty--yet subject to reason. Has this view been superseded? If so, what has replaced it?

How do we develop a strategy for cyber threats?

Clausewitz stresses that the primary task of statesmen and commanders is to understand the character of the war in which they are engaging. What strategic implications derive from an assessment of the character of a potential our war against China?

Sun Tzu stresses the importance of understanding yourself and the enemy. Who has better fulfilled that prescription—America's strategic leaders or those of Salafist leaders who have proclaimed "jihad" against us?

How do al Qaeda and ISIS differ? How well is coalition military power doing against each? How do these fights compare with irregular warfare that you studied earlier in this course?

Which belligerent—the United States or al Qaeda--has done a better job of mastering interaction, adaptation, and reassessment?

Has either the United States or al Qaeda/ISIS achieved significant strategic benefit from the opening of new theaters? If so, where, why, and how? If not, why not?

Sun Tzu advised attacking the enemy's strategy and/or enemy alliances. How, and to what extent, does that insight apply to the war between al Qaeda/ISIS and the coalition of governments led by the U.S.?

Many have argued that the key to victory over al Qaeda/ISIS lies in the mobilization of Muslim opponents of jihadist terrorism. What U.S. policies and strategies are most likely to encourage such mobilization? And, will it help if we emphasize the transcendent value of democratic forms of government when speaking with the Muslim world?

Why has there been such difficulty in "winning the peace" in Afghanistan? What is the current trajectory of the Afghan people vis-à-vis outside groups?

What is the strategic relationship between the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the protection of the American homeland from a terrorist attack?

What mix of military action and diplomatic action is most likely to produce either a favorable or an acceptable outcome in the Afghanistan theater for the United States and its allies?

How much of a role are chemical and biological weapons playing in conflict? Should we expect more of either in the near future? Can terrorist groups be deterred from using them?

Which rising power, China or India, can best turn its strategic orientation from land to sea in the twenty-first century? Do you think these two massive states will compete, or cooperate?

Is China overrated as a potential peer competitor of the United States? How about Russia?

More than a century ago, Mahan identified key elements or prerequisites for a country to become a great sea power. In the twenty-first century, what factors are most important for becoming or remaining a great sea power?

We know that Chinese admirals are reading Mahan's work. In what ways might concepts propounded by Mahan more than a century ago still be of utility to Chinese or Indian maritime strategists?

One observer of international relations maintains: "the United States is not exempt from the historical pattern of great-power decline. The country needs to adjust to the world of 2025 when China will be the number-one economy and spending more on defense than any other nation. Effective strategic retrenchment is about more than just cutting the defense budget; it also means redefining America's interests and external ambitions. Hegemonic decline is never painless. As the twenty-first century's second decade begins, history and multipolarity are staging a comeback. The central strategic preoccupation of the United States during the next two decades will be its own decline and China's rise." Discuss.

Readings

Col. Qiao Liang and Col. Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* [Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1999]; Dehradum, India: Natraj Publishers, 2007, ed. Albert Santoli). Also available on the web.

The White House, National Security Strategy (2017), and Summary of the National Defense Strategy (2018). Available on the White House web site.

Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: *Competition Continuum*. C. 18 pp. Available on line at the Defense Dept. web site.

Also recommended:

Mackubin T. Owens, "Reflections on Future War." E-Reserve.

Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Pp. 804-836. Shelf Reserve.

United States Departments of the Army and the Navy, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 *Counterinsurgency*, 2006. Shelf Reserve.

Class 14: Papers are due. Systematic Course Discussion by the Seminar and Review

Class 15: Final Examination (closed book, in class, written exam)

*Christopher C. Harmon is lead editor of the book Statecraft and Power *(1994). He became an adjunct faculty member at IWP after 9-11 and has presented three of his new terrorism books here at evening lectures—most recently* The Terrorist Argument *(Brookings, 2018). A former congressional aide for foreign policy, Dr. Harmon went on to direct core courses on "Theory & Nature of War" and "Strategy and Policy" for Marine Corps University and has taught those subjects and related military history at U.S. graduate schools over many years.*

The intellectual heritage of the above pages owes much to past faculty of the Naval War College, including "Policy & Strategy" dept. chair Al Bernstein. Most of the prose in this syllabus is the work of Dr. Mac Owens of the Naval War College and later Academic Dean at IWP for three years. Dr. Harmon was an Associate Professor of Strategy at NWC/Newport from 1988 to 1992.